By Yohannes
Berhe; January 23, 2013
In the
first part of my commentaries, the future of democracy in Ethiopia, I presented
some of the potential threat to the stability of our country as a result of a
sudden turn of events. Further, I tried to highlight some of the pitfalls of
going into an election in a context of enormous uncertainty, as new actors
emerge, old elites remake themselves, and most of all in the absence of basic
democratic institutions that will provide checks and balances to the newly
elected government as well as an instrument for rational discussion of
contentious problems and settlement of different and potentially conflicting
social and political interests.
In my
subsequent commentary I will explore further some of the hurdles potentially
impeding us to move forward and some of the options that might be considered to
lay the foundation for a democratic future for Ethiopia and lasting peace based
on the rule of law.
Before I
embark upon my topic, however, I will offer a cursory observation of the
current stalemate. Dictators do not always appoint a successor. The fear of
losing power to a successor is all too real for any dictator to contemplate
grooming a successor, unless of course that person is a trusted kin, usually
someone in the family. In fact, dictators do not allow any single person to be
powerful enough to be a contender. Instead they encourage infighting among the
various potential contenders. I believe the events currently unfolding in
Ethiopia mirror this scenario. Despite his supporters’ accolade which sometimes
verges on a pathetic cult-like drama, the late dictator Melese, whom we are
lead to believe could walk on water, did not bother to clarify the succession
process -so much for his love for the country. After more than six month of his
death, the unelected leadership of the country is in turmoil. The biggest
obstacle is the ethnic policies. A mess of TPLF’s owns making and a legacy of
its “beloved” leader.
Experience
shows that almost any regime can produce short-lived results, but only
governments with a sound basis of legitimacy can produce sustainable ones. In
the case of Ethiopia, the fallacious and malignant ethnic policies have been
enforced through brute force and wide spread bribery, therefore, it makes the
current political crises virtually inevitable. The power struggles within the
TPLF and the satellite organizations that form the EPRDF continue unabated.
Meanwhile, sensing a power-vacuum, the ‘dragon lady’ is at it again. Someone
forgot to tell the widow of the late dictator that the prime ministership is
not hereditary and the palace belongs to the nation. She is becoming too much
to handle and an embarrassment to the TPLF that is desperately trying to
project, at least to the donor nations, an image of normalcy. On the other
hand, even though the prime minster office has now been reduced to figurehead,
the appointment of Hailemariam Desalegn as the PM has been anything but a
smooth one. It will be incredibly naïve to think his appointment will somehow
bring about changes in the way the country is governed. In the first place, the
like of Hailemarim would have never been appointed by a narcissist Melese
without being carefully vetted and screened to be properly sycophantic. In
fact, the narcissist and the sycophant need each other. The narcissist is
dependent on the sycophant to feed his ego. Most often, a narcissist surrounds
himself with “yes men” who the narcissist sees as no threat to him. On the
other hand, the sycophant derives a lot of self-worth from the narcissist as
the relationship with the narcissist gives the sycophant a social standing he
otherwise would not have. In short, the relationship between the narcissist and
sycophant is symbiotic; each feeding and dependent on the other. In the case of
Hailemariam, he has so internalized a servile attitude he seems to have
difficultly to shake it off even after more than six months after the death of
his master, whose manner and demeanor he is trying to imitate. No wonder, even
the mercurial leader of Eritrea (Issayas Afeworki) refuses to meet him. Quite
shrewdly, Afeworki wants to deal with puppeteers not the puppet. For now
everyone is keeping up the pretense. In fact, the latest shenanigan gives a
whole new meaning to the expression "The Emperor has no clothes”.
It is a sad
commentary indeed that a country that claims more than three thousand years of
proud legacy has become a playground for the likes of Azeb Mesfin, a functional
illiterate, to Sebhat Nega and Bereket Simon. These individuals are totally
devoid of basic decency and are best known for their racist and divisive remark
and their deep seated prejudice and low regard for the aspiration of the
Ethiopian people. Obviously, they are not alone; in fact, an incredibly crass
attitude seems to permeate the top echelon of the TPLF.
Casting off
the shackles of history
Nothing has
been reviewed so relentlessly over the years with so little in the way of
direction or useful purpose as the issue of Ethiopian nationhood. Much has been
said about the disenfranchisement of ethnic groups, their grievances; hence,
the genesis of the Ethiopian problem. Various groups have adapted historical
claims in the service of their political goals. The variety of these
engagements with the past and the extent this process informs current public
discussion and debate might conceivably warrant our attention. However, the
superfluous attention paid to these issues has become a distraction from
corrosive and dehumanizing effect of poverty and luck of basic freedom. To some
extent, it betrays our reluctance to accept the reality of who we are- lately,
a nation of dismal distinction - and most of all our ignorance about the value
of history. Which is moral; therefore, its main purpose should be to prepare us
to understand the past in order to build a better future. The political
conundrum we find ourselves in today is due in part to the simplistic
misreading of our history. It’s this narrowly framed univocal narrative of the
'Nation-State' that enabled ethno-nationalists such as TPLF to dominate the
political discourse.
The issue
has been cited and discussed in numerous writings; therefore, I am not going to
dwell too much on it here, but instead I highly recommend reading Tesfaye
Demmellash’s, Toward Ethiopia’s Democratic Renewal: Dismantling Authoritarian
Ethnicism, succinct and well-reasoned article. His salient point (at least as
far as the point I would like to emphasize) is to debunk the many versions of
Ethiopian “exceptionalism” that focus on separate identity formation and
heavily rely on tired and discredited Marxists argument. It is common to read
history backward and assume that a particular group is destined to become
dominant, but conflict is part of the historical narrative and as such
unavoidable part of human experience marked by complex relations and a never
ending alternation between the oppressed and oppressors. A significant
component of the walls of suspicion among us is the baggage that we carry in
the form of historical narrative and particularly a deterministic notion of
identity. I am not in any way suggesting we should not be unmoved by the past
history of suffering and humiliation. After all, our experience and memories
help to shape our identity. Only by acknowledging our historical legacy, even
when it might be painful, can we come to terms with our past as a way to better
understand ourselves, identify our weaknesses and strengths and build a better
future.
Ethnocracy
under the guise of ethnic federalism
Ethnocracy,
like a racist power structure, exists to the extent it is able to rely on a
naked power grab and contempt for the democratic process. The unfolding
succession of events is proof that the misguided ethnic policy promoted by TPLF
for the last 20 years or so did not work to unify the various nationalities,
nor have they helped usher the country in new era of economic prosperity. This,
despite the fact the country has received unprecedented foreign aid and the
much-purported double-digit growth (Ethiopia is still ranked among the poorest
even by African standard). What it did instead is create a political structure
with ethnocractic features. An ethnic Tigrean elite completely controls - and
occupies virtually all positions in - the judiciary, public administrative
organs, the police, the armed forces and increasingly education. While Oromo
and Amhara constitute a majority of the population, The Tigrean presence in all
these spheres of power far exceeds their ratio within the general population.
This
minority role is not only unsustainable over the long run, but also dangerous,
for it creates a distinct sense of ethnic entitlement at the expense of merit
and need based public administration. Marginalized political groups develop an
ethno-nationalist discourse as opposed to democratic governance, arguing that
their exclusion violates the principle of ethnic representation as outlined by
TPLF’s own ethnic policy. The biggest challenge facing the future of democracy
in Ethiopia is indeed this notion of ethnic entitlement. One can only hope this
troubling form of identity politics has not yet become deeply entrenched to the
point where a new order based on democratic norms will not be able to fill the
crack created by ethnic schism and the related deficit of trust among us.
Conceptual
and empirical flows of ethnic federalism
In a
democracy we choose the representatives who will make the laws and policies
that govern how we live together. The current ethnic policy is not only an act
of tyranny of the highest order, but is a nullity due to the illegitimacy of
the TPLF/EPRDF regime. That being said, here are some of the conceptual and
empirical flows demonstrating how the policy has been fraudulent from the very
outset:
First, the
notion of singular identity is flimsy at best (see my commentary The fallacy of
identity politics). Take for example someone who was born in Addis Ababa (a
cosmopolitan city by all account) whose parents came from two distinct ethnic
heritages - say Tigre and Oromo- and yet the only language s/he has spoken is
Amharic. Which ethnic group this person ought to be “assigned”? What if by
virtue of his/her upbringing and the multicultural environment of his/her
surroundings s/he does not feel allegiance to any of his/her parent’s ethnic heritage?
The issue could be complicated even more if we add to the mix the unavoidable
dynamics of intermarriage with other group that constitute the Ethiopian
cultural mosaic. I can go on with other complex scenarios, but there is no need
to press the point further, for only in the context of democracy that the
questions of choice arises. A person's identity cannot be given to them instead
a person must achieve a sense of identity through personal experience and self-search
as a result of his/her cultural heritage and current surroundings. Above all
one can bear allegiance to multiple identities at any one time.
Second,
with more than 80 ethno linguistic groups it is an insurmountable task to come
up with a self-governing political arrangement that will satisfy everyone.
Furthermore, sine the ultimate goal of political empowerment is to shape a
favorable resource allocation, in poor countries such as Ethiopia that cannot
accommodate such demands through redistribution, it is inevitable that a spiral
of escalations might be set in motion leading to various levels and forms of
violence. Violent conflict has already occurred in many parts of the country.
Also, since it is difficult to sustain the ideology of ethnic entitlement in
the context of a multiethnic country, the introduction of ethnic based
political arrangement has resulted in gross human rights violations by the
TPLF/EPRDF acting as enforcer of the “ethnic rules”. In some cases, the tension
among various nationalities is deliberately concocted by the cadres of the
ruling party in order to counterbalance the threat from the major ethnic groups
-Oromo and Amhara which constitute more 60 percent of the total population of
the country.
Third,
ethnic entitlement has always hinged on elite interest. The elite, which claim
exclusive right to represent the ethnic group has a vested interest in
exaggerating difference for self-seeking benefit. In addition, a culture of
entitlement breeds incompetency by giving more weight to loyalty than to merit.
There is also a more insidious reason why the ascendancy of ethnic elites has
been actively encouraged by the regime. Most of these individuals are not only
steeped in corruption, but also they are involved in gross human rights
violations; hence, they are alienated from their own constituencies. As a
result, they are easily susceptible to the TPLF’s manipulation and coercion.
Mismanagement and human rights abuse by regional as well as local leaders have
been used as a bargaining mechanism for the ruling TPLF/EPRDF to secure the
allegiance of the regional and local elites. This is as true in Tigray as is in
Wellega or any other part of Ethiopia – this writer refuses to acknowledge the
ethnic nomenclature imposed on the nation.
Fourth, as
we have seen above, the so called “ethnic federalism” has been nothing, but the
biggest fraud in Ethiopian history. Although the TPLF has been the main
proponent of ethnic policy, is not genuinely committed to devolving power from
the center to the region or “kilil” as they are called. In terms of ethnic
entitlement, the Tigrayan ethnic group accounts approximately for 5 percent of
the total population of Ethiopia, therefore in accordance with its own ethnic
entitlement formula, TPLF’s (which claims to represent the province of Tigray)
share in the federal government should have been proportional to its population
share.
As we all
know, however, this is not case. In fact, if the ethnic policy was genuinely
applied, TPLF would have been the main “looser” while the Amhara and Oromo
would have been the relative beneficiaries. This apparent inconsistency laid
bare the TPLF’s trickery and cynical ploy to divide the country along ethnic
line for the sole purpose of maintaining its hegemony. That being said, while
the initial focus of TPLF is mostly establishing an ethnic hegemony, now is
increasingly about accumulating personal wealth through corruption and outright
theft of the country’s resources– through plenty of phony transaction and
criminal activity thrown in (Ethiopia Central Bank Buys Fake Gold).
Finally,
minority ethnic rulers can only rely upon a narrow circle of kin or ethnic
acquaintances, further reducing their legitimacy in the eyes of the majority
and enhancing their need to rely on “their own” people. And so, ever smaller
and more closely-knit groups assert themselves. By this I am not in any way
suggesting that all Tigreans are the beneficiary of TPLF’s largesse. In fact
one of the insidious tactics used by the regime is to use a combination of
threat and bribe to subjugate individuals from all walks of life to do their
dirty work for them. In the face of fear and insecurity, the prime motive for
anyone to ally with the regime may be mere survival. This is especially
apparent in dictatorships and authoritarian states when most of the population
has been fed propaganda and triumphalism and has been kept in the dark about
important turns of events. These - sometimes unwitting accomplices might belong
to any ethnic group, so much so that it’s becoming common to refer to them
derogatively as wayane-amhara, wayane-oromo, etc. The main point I would like
to emphasize here is that, barring any crime committed in the name of identity,
any real or perceived benefit enjoyed by any group at the expense of any other
is the symptoms not the cause of the national problem. The underlying problem
is the lack of good governance and the absence of enabling factors:
accountability, social justice, transparency and rule of law. Focusing on
transient issue of favoritism will only serve to provoke and divert attention
from the real struggle that is being waged, and to emasculate our resolve to
build a just society. Inequality and human rights violation cannot be
understood properly without exploring the lack of accountability in governance
and without first acknowledging our personhood. Indeed, minority groups are a
natural ally for a political order that guarantees individual rights, of which
group right is the inevitable corollary.
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